Article written by Angélique Curdy (LinkedIn).[1] Cover image by Stefan Kostić (Bajina Basta, Serbia).
Serbia, a country bordering the European Union through its borders with Bulgaria and Romania, is a unique country in many respects. This Balkan country aspires to join the European Union; after an official application for membership in 2009, Serbia was granted candidate status in 2012. Despite the start of discussions in January 2014 and the opening of 22 negotiation chapters, the country has not yet joined the EU. On the other hand, Russia, which shares many cultural and historical ties with Belgrade, is seeking to secure the loyalty of this country, which is also attracting Chinese investment.
Serbia, a country bordering the European Union through its borders with Bulgaria and Romania, is a unique country in many respects. This Balkan country aspires to join the European Union; after an official application for membership in 2009, Serbia was granted candidate status in 2012. Despite the start of discussions in January 2014 and the opening of 22 negotiation chapters, the country has not yet joined the EU. On the other hand, Russia, which shares many cultural and historical ties with Belgrade, is seeking to secure the loyalty of this country, which is also attracting Chinese investment.
Today, it seems that Serbia is dealing with three major powers: the European Union, Russia and China. Young Serbs seem to want to turn more towards European values, while the government remains open to discussions with Russia and partnerships with China. What are the ins and outs of Serbian diplomacy today?
1. Serbia and the European Union
Serbia applied to join the European Union in December 2009. Since then, Serbia has been working to align itself with the conditions for EU membership. This process of Europeanisation aims to prepare candidate countries to align themselves with the democratic values and standards promoted by the European Union. Serbia is in a special position compared to its neighbours: the European Union has pushed for the re-establishment of a dialogue with Kosovo (see Solsletten, chapter 4.3, 2023). Tense relations with Kosovo have slowed down the discussions, but Serbia has agreed to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which has allowed for some progress in European negotiations. Although many post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe wish to join the EU, many political parties have switched from supporting European integration to opposing or even totally rejecting it (Stojic, 2006). Serbia is no exception.
Aleksandar Vučić, first re-elected under a pro-European banner, after a first term driven by economic austerity, had worked on maintaining ties with the EU and improving its image from 2015 onwards – discussions with Kosovo, sharing quotas for taking in migrants with Germany during the migration crisis, etc. However, these efforts quickly slowed down, with the fight against corruption and organised crime not following the ambitious roadmap announced, and ‘ballot box stuffing’ practices having been noted by international observers during elections, particularly in 2023. At the end of 2022, the European Commission emphasised the country’s very moderate progress in a report. Indeed, the document raises concerns about the rule of law in Serbia, as well as unclear positions regarding Russia, which Serbia has not explicitly condemned for the war in Ukraine, while having welcomed Russian officials targeted by European sanctions in Belgrade, or by going directly against European positions towards Russia. In February 2023, despite European sanctions, Serbia received weapons sent by Russia; with the Kosovo issue still a hot topic, Vučić continues to arm his military forces. In April 2023, according to Reuters, Serbia, under pressure from the European Union, nevertheless agreed to send weapons to Ukraine. However, the country is participating in European humanitarian and financial aid for Ukraine, still without taking sanctions against Russia.
In 2024, the Commission again signalled a need for Serbia to strengthen its freedom of speech, the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption, while also preparing a package of economic and institutional reforms, supported by a European plan of 1.5 billion euros. The European Investment Bank has also given the green light for 160 billion euros of aid for small and medium-sized Serbian enterprises. According to Ivan Vejvoda of the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Vučić is engaged in a balancing act between the European Union and his other partners, for example by meeting Ursula Von der Leyen in October 2024; the President of the Commission having assured in a press release that Serbia still wanted to move towards a European future. Indeed, Serbia is cooperating with the European Union on the mobility of its citizens, and is a signatory to a strategic partnership on critical raw materials and the value chains of batteries and electric vehicles. This agreement, in addition to being part of the green transition desired by the EU, demonstrates Serbia’s continued willingness to integrate into the single market. In the same way, Serbia has signed an agreement with the European Union and FRONTEX to strengthen cooperation on migration and border management.
However, these agreements, signed in July 2024, are not the only ones: in the same month, Serbia signed a free trade agreement with China, which is in contradiction with an integration into the European Union’s single market. In September 2024, the President declared ‘without shame’ at the GLOBESEC conference that Serbia ‘had good ties with Russia, Serbia being the only country in Europe not to have imposed any sanctions on Russia’ (with regards to the situation in Ukraine). However, on 7 November 2024, at the summit of the European Political Community, Vučić attempted to smooth things over with his European partner, calling for a truce or a ceasefire in Ukraine and assuring that Serbia remained loyal to the Union.
The European Union, Serbia’s partner in the west, is obviously not the only partner of Belgrade, which is influenced by two Eastern giants: Russia and China. Let us first look at the case of Russia, which positions itself as a big sister to this Balkan country.
2. Serbia and Russia
Serbia and Russia have historically been linked, at least since the 12th century, with the two peoples sharing a Slavic Orthodox heritage. For these reasons, Russia emphasises the promotion of commonalities between Serbia and Russia, also exacerbating a sense of mistrust of NATO. The NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo war is described by Russia as a Western aggression (Solsletten, p.15, 2023). Orthodox Patriarch Kirill of Moscow also follows the narrative of the Russian World and Holy Russia pushed by the Kremlin, and his counterpart, Patriarch Porfirje of Serbia, emphasises the belonging of the Serbian World to the Russian religious sphere (Klarić, D. and Mandić, J., 2024). The idea of brotherhood between the two countries was demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic, when Russia sent to Serbia medical equipment, qualified personnel and Sputnik vaccines, which were to be produced in Serbia, without success. Moreover, as Russia supports the Serbian argument regarding Kosovo, Serbia does not interfere in the Ukrainian case either. A large number of Russians have settled in Serbia following the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, and the Serbian population has welcomed them without incident thanks to the historical proximity of their cultures. With a higher purchasing power than Serbs, Russians are contributing to the country’s economic growth.
Moscow and Belgrade also have very strong economic ties: even after the European economic sanctions due to the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Serbia continued and even increased its imports to Russia. However, the slowdown of the Russian economy has had the effect of tempering economic exchanges, without stopping them, although there was a 46.3% decrease between 2022 and 2023. Serbia also depends on Russia for its energy, but also for its telecommunications technologies and the supply of factory materials. Serbia also imports a lot of Russian mineral fuels and chemical products, and mainly exports agricultural products and transport equipment/machinery (Jovičić & Marjanović, 2024).
According to research by Jovičić & Marjanović (2024), Serbia’s commitment to the European Union forces it to apply European sanctions on Russia: The European oil embargo, in which Belgrade did not wish to participate, forced the country to cease exports to Russia because they were passing through European Union ports. The development of economic cooperation between the two countries depends largely on Serbia’s position vis-à-vis the European Union – it should be kept in mind that, in addition to historical ties and Russia’s non-recognition of Kosovo, Serbia is currently almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, although the government is aware of the need to diversify its energy suppliers. European pressure has therefore not prevented Serbia from cultivating its ties with Russia, or even with China, and vice versa (Jovičić & Marjanović, 2024).
According to Solsletten (2023), Russia’s significant presence in Serbia’s political life is the biggest obstacle to progress in negotiations for its accession to the European Union. Juncaj’s (2024) research presents the Russian storytelling in Serbia, which fosters a negative narrative about the European Union. In numerous statements, Russia insists on Europe’s preference for Kosovo: European mediation efforts being biased and responding more to Kosovo’s demands than to Serbia’s, the European failure to establish the Community of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo… the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo being a key aspect of the country’s accession to the European Union, Russia knows that this is a sensitive issue and is calling for European mediation that is more Serbian-oriented. Furthermore, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. Lavrov, has assured Serbia of Russia’s ‘unconditional support’ – a reassuring expression for a country seeking to develop and assert itself. Russia also depicts European demands as ‘threats, blackmail and pressure on Serbia’, emphasising that Serbia is being forced to sacrifice its values in order to join an authoritarian European Union, which is only seeking to deceive Belgrade. Serbia also has observer status with the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation), a Russian-led military alliance.
Russia presents itself as Serbia’s sister, a faithful partner offering unconditional support and sharing a common history and religion. Vladimir Putin has also awarded the Order of St Alexander Nevsky to A. Vučić, A. Lukashenko (Belarus), N. Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan), E. Rahmon (Tajikistan) and other leaders in the Russian sphere of influence with the Order of St Alexander Nevsky (Klarić, D. and Mandić, J., 2024), emphasising their role in the construction of the Russian nation, their merit and their loyalty to Russia.
The Russian Federation is presenting itself as the target of a defamation campaign by the European Union, seeing it as a sort of common enemy with Serbia. To spread this narrative, Russia is taking advantage of its freedom of action in the media sector in Serbia: it has set up several of its affiliated media outlets in Belgrade: Sputnik, the TASS news agency, RT Balkan and Russia Beyond the Headlines. Russia’s communication strategy is to use these media outlets to foster an environment that is more favourable to it than to the EU. (Klarić, D. and Mandić, J., 2024) According to Reporters Without Borders, the Russian media in Serbia share disinformation about Ukraine, encouraging the involvement of Serbian mercenaries in the Wagner group, presenting Russia as a symbol of security and protection of the interests of Serbia, the EU and NATO as institutions in decline. While in December 2022, according to polls by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 45.5% of Serbs preferred their country to remain neutral in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in May 2024, according to Radio Free Europe, 49% of citizens thought that the intervention in Ukraine was justified. Pro-government Serbian newspapers sing the praises of Russia and its presence in Serbia, as the ruling party is on good terms with Moscow. Also according to Reporters Without Borders, the independent Serbian media outlet KRIK is the target of numerous abusive lawsuits seeking to silence it. In 2024, two independent Serbian journalists, Ana Lalic and Dinko Gruhonjic, received death threats, without the country’s justice system showing any concern. Reporters Without Borders has also been accused by RT Balkan of spreading false information and of being an organisation paid by the West. On this topic, President Vučić said that it was necessary to ‘listen to all sides’ of a story. These media maneuvers have been denounced by participants in the demonstrations against corruption that have been taking place throughout Serbia since December 2024.
In short, Russia, which has shared long-standing ties with Serbia, is using its soft power to ensure the loyalty of this Balkan state. Disinformation, monopoly of energy supply and omnipresence in the media are the ingredients to justify the friendship between Belgrade and Moscow, despite the demands of the European Union. But the Russian Federation is not the only one interested in Serbia: China also wants to make a place for itself on the list of Belgrade’s eastern partners.
3. Serbia and China
In 2009, Serbia first signed a framework agreement for technical and economic cooperation with China. Since 2012, Belgrade has been part of a broader alliance of Central and Eastern European countries with China, called PECO+1, or 16+1, promising ‘better times’, increased employment rates and economic renewal through agricultural exports to China.
China seemed a more neutral alternative than Russia for establishing international agreements, as it did not impose political conditions on an economic partnership, at least not officially. Although they began in the 2010s, Chinese investments in Serbia have multiplied in recent years, which was an alternative during the euro crisis, when the flow of European money was lower (Courmont, 2015). In 2022, it was estimated that China was one of Serbia’s most important trading partners, ahead of Russia (Jovičić & Marjanović, 2024). During the Covid-19 pandemic, China helped Serbia by supplying masks, sanitary equipment and Sinovac vaccines, in addition to vaccines sent by Russia.
In addition, the financing allocated to the CEECs+1 is offered by China with an interest rate of 3%. Each Western Balkan country accepting these Chinese subsidies receives support of 1 to 2 million euros per year in the form of donations of construction and public works equipment and loans for large infrastructure projects (LIPs), with Belgrade receiving three-quarters of the Chinese loans for the region. These construction projects are being carried out without a contract award procedure, with China proposing its own equipment and service providers. For many construction projects, Chinese funding was the only viable option because construction/modernisation projects were often rejected by Western partners for economic or environmental reasons (Krstinovska, 2022).
These partnerships with China are a way for Beijing to exert pressure on Brussels (Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2022). Compared to the co-signatories of the 16+1 economic agreement, Serbia is highly favoured by Chinese investments (Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2022; Courmont, 2015), and China is one of the most important economic partners for Serbia (Jovičić & Marjanović, 2024).
However, the quality of the work undertaken by Chinese companies is not the best. On 1st November 2024, the platform of Novi Sad station, which had been renovated as part of a Chinese project, collapsed, killing 14 people. This event caused a great deal of indignation in the country, resulting in numerous large-scale demonstrations, accompanied by major strikes, as the people denounced the high level of government corruption (and media corruption, see previous chapter). At the beginning of March 2025, these demonstrations were still ongoing, having led to the resignation of the Prime Minister, Milos Vucecic.
Ceteris Paribus, China is also investing in artificial intelligence in Serbia, particularly with the presence of the high-tech company Huawei. Since 2020, the Serbs have established a roadmap for the development of artificial intelligence, with the support of Huawei, particularly on the SafeCity surveillance camera project, raising questions about the protection of citizens’ data and privacy. In addition, China has supplied Serbia with modern air defence systems and drones.
As the Balkans are an important part of the New Silk Road project, China is being generous and attentive to its 16+1 partners, despite Lithuania’s abandonment of the agreement. Diplomacy, as we know, is a weapon like any other: Serbia is still proclaiming its authority over Kosovo, and seems to appreciate the fact that China does not recognise Kosovan independence. Perhaps out of loyalty to its previous commitments, Belgrade supported China during the UN debates on the Xinjiang internment camps, Serbia being the only Balkan country to support China on this issue (Sainovic, 2021). Turning to China allows Serbia to show the European Union that other partners can support its projects. However, according to Sainovic (2021), neither China nor Russia appear to be viable alternatives to European Union patronage in the Western Balkans region, although Serbia appreciates navigating between the various powers that are reaching out to it.
Could resolving disputes with the EU ward off the shadow of Beijing, as well as that of Moscow?
4. Serbia today: quo vadis?
In reality, Serbia in 2025 is in better shape than it was a decade ago, having modernised and internationalised. It is a country with its own self-determination, and as such it is trying to find its balance between the major powers present: Russia, the European Union and China. Vučić makes no secret of his interest in partnerships with China, or the historical closeness between his country and Russia, and seems to have lost interest in the efforts to align with European values, which are nevertheless essential for accession to the European Union, as requested by a large part of the population. Serbia is also not categorically rejecting European financial support.
As we have seen previously, Russia has a significant presence in the Serbian economy, through its investments and the energy cooperation between the two countries. Its anti-European narrative in the Serbian media, coupled with Chinese investments and the absence of calls for tenders for contracts already promised to China, cultivates an environment that is not conducive to progress towards the European Union. According to Transparency International, the European Union sends development funds to Eastern European countries, with too little accountability on the part of the countries receiving the money.
As the legislation in force in Serbia is not aligned with European requirements, the construction of underground railways, roads and infrastructure such as Novi Sad station has been able to take place without public calls for tenders and has been subject to few controls. The public, especially young people, are increasingly complaining about this lack of transparency and the authorities’ laziness when it comes to improving the relevant laws.
Documents provided by the EU and NGOs, and articles written by researchers, show an ambivalent attitude on the part of the Serbian state in the way it approaches its diplomatic relations. The accident at Novi Sad station revealed the impact of clientelism in the public procurement sector, to the detriment of the security of citizens’ data. These actions, coupled with the government’s lack of response to European demands for Serbia’s accession to the EU, have further exasperated the crowds, especially the youth. As the youngest generation did not experience Yugoslavia or the Milošević era, it seems to seek to link its history to that of the European Union, which promotes values with which young people identify more. While President Vučić does not seem to really falter in the face of large-scale demonstrations in his country, is he hoping that the crowds will run out of energy, or is he taking the time to choose whether he will lead his country towards a more European future, or towards the Russian and Chinese partners who are reaching out to him?
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Endnotes
- Angélique Curdy is passionate about Central and Eastern Europe. She holds a bachelor’s degree in translation from Cardiff University and a master’s degree in political science from the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB). During her studies at Science Po ULB, she chose to focus on Eastern and post-Soviet countries (Russian politics, the history of Central and Eastern Europe, comparative politics), with a minor in political communication. She now works in the European Quarter of Brussels. ↑
