Jakub Stepaniuk – University of Graz
Jakub Stepaniuk is a young researcher, scholar and social activist. After graduating from the University College London in summer 2021, where he studied Social Sciences of Eastern Europe, he obtained his double MA degree in International Relations, Law and Politics of the Southeast Europe in Graz and Ljubljana, currently awaiting defence of the thesis on Serbian foreign policy and the EU integration. So far, he has lived, studied or worked for various NGOs in Poland, England, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Austria and Slovenia. Jakub is a huge enthusiast of foreign languages, long distance cycling, studies of identity, Europeanisation, nationalisms, national minorities, migrations, regional geopolitics and human rights.
This contribution is part of the book “The Dragon at the Gates of Europe: Chinese presence in the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe” (more info here) and has been selected for open access publication on Blue Europe website for a wider reach. Citation:
Stepaniuk, Jakub, Perception of Chinese presence in Polish and Serbian media, in: Andrea Bogoni and Brian F. G. Fabrègue, eds., The Dragon at the Gates of Europe: Chinese Presence in the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe, Blue Europe, Dec 2023: pp. 511-542. ISBN: 979-8989739806.
1. Introduction
It has been already over a decade since China officially announced its interests in political and economic developments of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Consequently, governments of CEE states started to perceive China as an increasingly significant partner that affected their own foreign policy agendas. One has to mention about two crucial expressions of these interests. The first one called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was introduced in 2013 and represents a global strategy for infrastructural development supposed to connect China with the rest of the world (Szunomár, 2018). The second one announced in 2012 in Budapest and initiated with a conference in Warsaw assumes the framework for economic cooperation between Beijing and 14 CEE states (Kaczmarski & Jakóbowski, 2015), hence its name is coined as 14+1 initiative[1]. From the Chinese perspective, both BRI and 14+1 are treated as mechanisms facilitating trade between China and the EU. CEE region is supposed to serve for Beijing as the “gate” to enter the EU, therefore, the more developed the 14+1 framework the easier it would be for China to trade with the EU. From the CEE’s point of view, cooperation with Beijing denotes new investment and development opportunities that might serve as an additional financial source along EU cohesion funds and trade with EU member states.
Lavish investments into CEE’s infrastructure supposed to benefit everyone indeed portray an idealised picture of Chinese intentions. On the one hand, Beijing attempts to generate soft power mechanisms accompanying various foreign direct investments (FDIs) in order to promote Chinese culture as well as to improve its own international image. On the other hand, the most Eurosceptic political actors in CEE perceive China as a counterbalancing leverage against the EU and/or the US. Interestingly enough, some elements of the 14+1 initiative coincide with the fundaments of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), another framework for regional cooperation in CEE launched by Poland and Croatia in 2015 (Grgić, 2023). Even though the EU supports various forms of regional cooperation supposed to accelerate overall Europeanisation processes, such ideas as 14+1 or 3SI are seen by Eurosceptic leaders in CEE as the expression of political independence and resistance to Brussels. For instance, following understanding of the Polish government attempting to take the regional leadership role in 14+1 and 3SI, decision-making architecture of the EU is highly dependent on Germany and France which deprives other member states of sovereignty (Soroka & Stępniewski, 2019). Therefore, emergence of such projects as 3SI or 14+1 shall demonstrate the existence of alternative voices in Europe which reject liberal ideological values and economic model subordinated to German and French interests (Cadier, 2021). Similarly, Chinese presence in the Western Balkans shows that the EU integration and conditionality are ineffective and lead to the power vacuum. Decreasing credibility of the EU due to unfulfilled membership promise makes Chinese, Russian or Turkish alternatives increasingly attractive (Bieber & Tzifakis, 2019). The contemporary global balance of power indeed has different interpretations but one of the most popular views assumes the balance based on instable unipolarity with faltering role of the US or the West in general. According to realist conceptualisation, current unipolar balance of power gradually turns into the multipolar one with China serving as a candidate to play one of the most important roles in the new world order (Sahakyan, 2023). Therefore, anything that could undermine EU’s internal cohesion and enlargement inscribes into realisation of Chinese national interest.
Nonetheless, the realist interpretation of BRI and 14+1 assuming China countering the EU in CEE serves as a serious oversimplification and ignorance of the local political context. Indeed, one has to pose the question to what extent Chinese presence in CEE serves as an actual threat and to what extent this threat is only deliberately imagined and inflated. In order to answer this question, the following study is going to be based on a comparative analysis involving Poland and Serbia as case studies. Selection of Poland and Serbia for this work is pretty straightforward but involves a significant potential for the comparative study. Since Poland is the biggest country in CEE at the same time attempting to undermine the hierarchy of power distribution and normative character of the EU, Serbia is the biggest country in Western Balkans being in the most advanced stage of the EU integration and negotiations among all candidate states. Even though Belgrade declared accession to the EU in terms of its national strategy (Ponomareva, 2020), current doctrine of Serbian foreign policy agenda assumes maintenance of mutually balanced partnerships with other powers including Russia and China that would guarantee Serbian national security (Kapetanovic, 2020). This aligns with the neo-Titoist concept of foreign policy maximising number of friendly relations with other states and preventing excessive dependence on one of the world powers (Reid, 2021). This is quite important also in the context of China not recognising independence of Kosovo that counterbalances majority of Western states which acknowledge Kosovo as an independent state. In this sense, cases of Poland and Serbia are quite similar since both of them instrumentalise Beijing in order to challenge or counterbalance the EU. Whereas Poland would need China in order to strengthen impression of independence from Brussels with 14+1 and 3SI, Serbia could use Chinese influences in order to prevent universal recognition of Kosovo independence and attract attention of the EU for the sake of receiving additional developmental funds or accelerating the process of the EU integration.
2. State of art
What is the actual economic influence of China in Poland and Serbia? According to the National Bank of Serbia, China covered 5.7% of FDIs in Serbia in the period between 2010 and 2021 whereas the EU was responsible for 63.6% (Gočanin & Ćosić, 2022). According to data found in publications of the National Bank of Poland, Chinese FDIs covered less than 1% of total FDIs in Poland in 2021 whereas the EU member states accounted for almost 85% (NBP, 2021). Even though the methodology of FDIs values in Poland is quite complex and other statistics provide different information due to issues with registration of business entities, share of Chinese FDIs in Poland according to other sources does not exceed 5% anyway (Rajca, 2022). Moreover, Serbian total imports account for 12% from China and 57% from the EU whereas the share of exports involves 16% to China and 64% to the EU (Gočanin & Ćosić, 2022). In case of Poland, China accounts for 13% of imports and only 1.17% of exports whereas Germany being the biggest trade partner for Poland covers 23.8% of Polish imports and 27.7% of Polish exports (OEC, 2021).
According to the abovementioned statistics, China serves as a secondary economic partner for both Poland and Serbia in contrast to the EU having the primary role in both trade and FDIs. What is important though is the way how China is perceived in both states. Opinion poll conducted by Demostat in 2022 on foreign policy preferences among Serbian citizens (Demostat, 2022) indicates that 34% of Serbs perceives China to be the biggest investor in Serbia whereas only 36% of people indicated the EU to invest the most. Consequently, 24% of respondents declared China to be Serbia’s most important political partner whereas the EU was indicated by 30% of people. The aggregate statistics regarding both China and Russia greatly inflate political and economic role of Beijing and Moscow in Serbia by underestimating the role of Brussels. The views are quite different when it comes to Poland. According to CEIAS study conducted in 2020 (Turcsányi et al., 2020), 41% of Poles perceive China negatively and only 31% positively. Important to take into consideration is also the fact that 34% of Poles worsened their opinion about China during past three years. Nonetheless, 84% of Poles consider China to be militarily strong (63% perceive the EU as militarily strong), 84% believe China is strong economically (77% about the EU) whereas 70% consider Chinese culture as attractive (73% find the EU culture attractive). In conclusion, opinion polls in Serbia and Poland on foreign policy and perception of China suggest the following hypotheses:
- Media discourses in Serbia promote positive image of Chinese presence in Serbia that inflates political and economic role of Beijing;
- A number of Poles perceiving China positively and Chinese culture as attractive indicates existence of positive media discourses on Chinese presence in Poland but the trend is in decline recently due to COVID implications and war in Ukraine.
3. Literature review
Similarities and differences of hypothesised media discourses on China in Poland and Serbia indicate an interesting research gap. Indeed, there is a number of publications regarding perception of China in CEE that follows Pan’s concept of dichotomous view of China in the US (Pan, 2012). According to him, China is portrayed in various media discourses as either an opportunity and a source of benefit or a threat to security. Dichotomous perception of Chinese presence in CEE was further elaborated by various regional scholars dealing with discursive analysis in Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary or Serbia.
Nevertheless, methodological focus on media discourses and qualitative picture of China in media outlets in CEE is quite limited. Turcsanyi in his study on Chinese perception in CEE despite mentioning about the role of media mainly focuses on opinions among regional experts on China (Turcsanyi, 2017). Grzywacz on the other hand conducted an elaborative analysis of perceptions of China in academic journals (Grzywacz, 2020). Other works such as an analysis of discourses on the railway between Łódź and Chengdu (Czerep, 2017) or dichotomous view of Chinese presence in Serbia (Pavlićević, 2018) indeed use media articles as empirical material but do not classify it into any deeper categories. More advanced analysis of media discourses on China in CEE was conducted by Kavalski who utilises quantitative bank of various articles to argue that regional media switch from representing China into localising it (Kavalski, 2021). In other words, instead of reproducing neo-colonial discourses denigrating Chinese agency, CEE media outlets increasingly utilise China as an example to portray and validate own decisions and domestic political behaviours. Kavalski uses data on articles collected for MapInfluenCE and ChinfluenCE projects coordinated by the Czech Association for International Affairs (AMO).
Some of the analyses conducted in the abovementioned projects attempt to explore media environment in the context of perceptions of China and Chinese presence. Bachulska for instance contributed with two recent reports. The first one compares the influence of Sputnik and China Radio International (CRI) in Poland and concludes that CRI’s outreach in social media has serious authenticity flaws meaning that direct Chinese disinformation in Poland has a very limited potential (Bachulska, 2022). The second one analyses how various media outlets in Poland report on China in the context of 5G and Chinese investments but the study is limited to quantitative dichotomous classification of articles into positive, negative and neutral categories (Bachulska, 2021). Another analysis conducted by CRTA show how media outlets in Serbia present issues about international politics and concludes that China has the most positive image in Serbian media among all world powers (CRTA, 2023).
Since CRTA and AMO studies analyse various aspects on portrayal of China and Chinese presence in local media, the dimension of media environment is quite limited. Media environment and freedom of press provide another interesting comparative potential for Poland and Serbia since both experience serious backsliding of media freedom in past years (Cianetti, Dawson, & Hanley, 2020). One of the consequences of the limited press freedom is a rising polarisation between pro- and anti-government media discourses. Therefore, this paper would analyse how China and Chinese presence in Poland and Serbia is presented in pro- and anti-government media outlets in order to see to what extent Polish and Serbian governments instrumentalise China in order to distort public discourses and realise foreign policy agendas. Hence, the analysis is going to be based on the following hypothesis: Pro-government media outlets in Poland and Serbia portray China and Chinese presence in a more positive light than anti-government ones.
4. Methodology
This study is going to be based on a qualitative analysis of carefully selected articles on China written between 2015 and 2023. Articles were collected with keywords that address Chinese presence in Poland and Serbia, FDIs and investments or mutual political and economic relations. The Polish case is going to be represented by liberal and anti-government newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza contrasted with articles found on the pro-government portal wPolityce that publishes weekly magazine Sieci. Gazeta Wyborcza is the most popular anti-government daily broadsheet in Poland established in 1989. With the polarisation of media scene in 2015, it became one of the most critical voices against activities of the Law and Justice government (Babovnikova, 2018). On the other hand, wPolityce was initially established in 2010 as an online “conservative portal” that “respects religion and traditions”. Its outreach expanded considerably with the electoral victory of Law and Justice in 2015 (Kujawiak, 2022). The Serbian case involves articles found in anti-government newspaper Danas and pro-government newspaper Politika. Whereas Danas that was found in 1997 is associated with one of few independent from the government media outlets in Serbia, Politika despite its long traditions dating back to 1904 and “non-tabloid” text production nowadays uncritically replicates the discourses promoted by the government (Kisić & Salamurović, 2023). Analysis includes 13 articles analysed in wPolityce, 18 in Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 in Danas and 11 in Politika. Pro- and anti-government sentiments of Gazeta Wyborcza, wPolityce, Danas and Politika are based on the currently existing research on media discourses in Poland (Dzięciołowski, 2017) and Serbia (Milutinović, 2021).
5. Perception of China in Polish media
Discursive similarities
The analysis is going to start with three evident similarities of discourses on Chinese presence in Poland in Gazeta Wyborcza and wPolityce. First of all, one can notice a significant positive perception of China in various articles before 2019. For instance, the visit of Xi Jinping to Poland in 2016 is described in a very positive tone. Diplomatic courtesy presented in wPolityce is expressed with Xi Jinping receiving a ball from the Polish President as a gift due to “Xi’s passion for football” (wPolityce, 2016b). At the same time, Gazeta Wyborcza mentions about Xi enjoying concert of the Polish classical music and design of the Royal Castle in Warsaw (Maciejasz, 2016). Two other articles in wPolityce briefly analyse benefits Poland can get from BRI investments (wPolityce, 2016c) emphasizing crucial geopolitical location of Poland for China (wPolityce, 2017). Gazeta Wyborcza is even more positive about Chinese FDIs and flourishing cooperation between Warsaw and Beijing. There are articles that express wishes and hopes for more Chinese investments in Poland (Mrożek, 2016), one text praises cooperation between Polish port in Gdańsk and the Chinese one in Qingdao additionally appreciating Chinese FDIs that could lead to opening of new 1115 vacancies in Poland (Karendys, 2016). Another article serves not only as an appreciation for Chinese investments in Polish energy networks but the language used almost resembles a free advertisement for Pinggao being “a huge and experienced company” as well as Sinohydro that successfully realised “the biggest hydroenergetic project in the world” (Sudak, 2017). The same article writes about failed construction of the motorway in 2012 by Chinese COVEC as an incident ensuring that it would never occur again. The text argues that audits of Chinese investments in Poland do not indicate any serious violations of standards and the overall quality of Chinese products significantly rose during past years.
The second similarity is a noticeable fall of positive discourses on China after 2021 in both wPolityce and Gazeta Wyborcza. Nonetheless, the character of negative discourses on China is a bit different. Whereas wPolityce focuses on international and political security challenges that associate China with Russia, Gazeta Wyborcza provides more information about risks regarding Chinese investments in Poland. Hence, wPolityce addresses provocative discourses on direct threats as in the case of an article analysing “Chinese attack” against Polish Prime Minister due to Taiwan issue (wPolityce, 2023b) or China spreading pro-Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine in order to undermine Polish national security (wPolityce, 2023d). Gazeta Wyborcza is more refined when it comes to portrayal of China and mentions about risks entailing Chinese investments in Africa to serve as a warning sign for Poland (Czubkowska, 2020), the director of Huawei in Poland being arrested under a threat of espionage (Pikuła, 2022) or present on the Polish market Chinese Nuctech devices being banned in Lithuania due to security concerns (Szostak, 2021). All in all, compared with highly favourable articles on Chinese FDIs in Poland in 2017, the assumption of China turning from a friendly “panda” into a dangerous “dragon” and a call to behave as more aware customers due to various security and moral dilemmas regarding Chinese products and investments (Pikuła, 2022) indeed demonstrate a significant change of discourses. This similarity also confirms one of the hypotheses of this study on reasons why so many Poles changed their opinion about China into the negative one during recent years.
The third similarity is quite surprising one in the context of falling positive discourses on China since 2021. Both wPolityce (wPolityce, 2021) and Gazeta Wyborcza (Stefanicki, 2021) write about positive aspects of the economic cooperation with China regarding purchase of Chinese vaccines against COVID. This can be explained with an argument that despite political environment becoming more confrontational and Chinese FDIs revealing security threats, the combat against COVID is an extraordinary situation that allows for exceptions in foreign policy including cooperation with Beijing. Nonetheless, the case of vaccines emerged before Russian invasion against Ukraine in 2022, in other words, current possible purchase of vaccines from China would be presumably more controversial than in 2021.
Discursive differences
The following section is going to analyse three major differences in discourses on China between wPolityce and Gazeta Wyborcza. Firstly, it is interesting to observe how the language on trade differs between the two media outlets. The articles found in wPolityce portray trade solely from the Polish perspective and Polish exports to China. Some of them are very optimistic arguing that Polish apples, poultry or pork might “conquer Chinese markets” (wPolityce, 2016a). The article on 14+1 (16+1 at that time) meeting in Dubrovnik in 2019 mentions a little about Chinese investments in Poland dedicating majority of space for Polish cosmetics and meat products to be exported to China (wPolityce, 2019). Gazeta Wyborcza perceives trade between Poland and China as something more double-sided. Indeed, there are texts mentioning about Polish exports of food, copper products or Barlinek planks being appreciated by Chinese customers (Maciejasz, 2020). However, majority of articles focus on bilateral economic cooperation expressed with a fair organised for investors in Ptak Warsaw Expo to connect Polish and Chinese entrepreneurs (Omran, 2018) or China planning to invest into Polish leather industry (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2021).
Secondly, both wPolityce and Gazeta Wyborcza talk about China as means to criticise someone else but the targets of this criticism differ significantly. wPolityce instrumentalises China in most critical articles after 2022 in order to condemn politics of the EU and Germany. One of the texts speculates reasons for Polish membership in the EU since Germany and France wish to trade with Beijing completely ignoring interests and security of the whole EU (wPolityce, 2023a). Another article mentions about a “shocking idea” of Ursula von der Leyen to cooperate with China in order to rebuild post-war Ukraine (wPolityce, 2023c). There is also a text using the expression which in a translation to English denotes an aggressive act of buying into Polish ports by Germans and Chinese (wPolityce, 2022b). Gazeta Wyborcza uses Chinese investments in order to criticise Polish government for being incompetent and not doing enough to attract Beijing. One of the articles mentions about ports in Estonia, Ukraine and Slovenia to be a serious competition for Poland if the government would be too inactive win attention of Beijing (Kublik, 2015). Another text criticises inability of the Polish government to offer a favourable background for Chinese investments (Bryła, 2018). As a consequence, trains of one of the BRI paths would go to Hungary instead. Other articles ridicule the government for refusing to answer the question whether there are any negotiations with Beijing going on (Bryła, 2017). There is also a text mocking Polish economic potential since milk, meat and apples are not enough to become a serious partner for China (Cieśla, 2019). The same article mentions about Antoni Macierewicz and Marek Suski, symbolic political figures of the ruling Law and Justice party associated with extreme nepotism and incompetence who are responsible for concluding agreements with Chinese investors. A recent article talks about a risky investment into the port in Świnoujście financed by an international enterprise from Qatar (Kraśnicki, 2023). The fact of China standing behind this investment risking new security threats serves as another indication for the overall incompetence and lack of security strategy in dealing with Chinese presence in Poland.
The third difference is a quite logical one. Since Gazeta Wyborcza does not praise the government for anything regarding cooperation with China, wPolityce attempt to create an impression of Poland being an important player in international politics by negotiating with one of the world powers. The articles however are deprived of much details and focus solely on the impression of the government being strategically important due to the sole act of talking with Beijing. Therefore, there is an article about Andrzej Duda discussing with Xi Jinping about international security but there are absolutely no details about content of these talks (wPolityce, 2022a). In a similar vein, the biggest ever air transport of medical equipment would be delivered from China to Poland. Someone who reads the article would not know the details of what exactly has been transported because what matters is the scale of the spectacular transport breaking global records in the history of aviation and Poland being part of it (wPolityce, 2020).
Conclusions
With reference to hypotheses presented in the paper, Polish case of discourse analysis demonstrates that COVID, rising tensions between the US and China and especially the outbreak of war in Ukraine demonstrate that the tone of articles on Chinese presence shifted drastically in 2021 from a positive to a negative one. This confirms the hypothesis why so many Poles changed their opinion about China in past years. Moreover, wPolityce does not publish more pro-Chinese articles than Gazeta Wyborcza. Quite the contrary, Gazeta Wyborcza’s pre-2019 articles on Chinese FDIs in Poland were more favourable in the context of the cooperation with Beijing than in wPolityce. Gazeta Wyborcza criticised as well the government for being incompetent and not doing enough to create good conditions for Chinese investments being consequently taken by other neighbouring countries. Post-2021 criticism for China in Gazeta Wyborcza was also more refined and less confrontational than in wPolityce. wPolityce instead took much more Poland-centric perspective and focused more on Polish exports to China than Chinese investments in Poland and associated China with Russia after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The abovementioned findings reject therefore the hypothesis on pro-government media outlet contributing to pro-Chinese discourses.
6. Perception of China in Serbian media
The following section is going to compare and contrast discourses on Chinese presence in Serbia in two media outlets, namely, Politika and Danas. Interestingly enough, in contrast to Poland, there is no major change in discourses when it comes to the timeline between 2015 and 2023. Both Politika and Danas report on Chinese FDIs in Serbia and trade cooperation between Belgrade and Beijing in a neutral or a positive light. Numerous articles are based on the hope for future investments and gratitude for flourishing relations in political and economic sense. Hence, Danas wrote a lot about perspectives for new vacancies in Serbia thanks to Chinese investments (Korkodelović, 2016), development of Serbian agriculture and export of plums to China (Danas, 2017a) or rising economic exchange encouraged by visa-free regime, more direct flights and hope that an agreement on free trade would be concluded in the upcoming future (Danas, 2023b). Danas replicates as well various statements made by the government without any comment or remark and reports, for instance, about Tomislav Nikolić becoming an honourable citizen of Beijing (Danas, 2017b) or common foreign and security policy interests associating Kosovo issue with Taiwan (Danas, 2023a). In this sense, discourses on China used by Politika when it comes to the narrative on “hope”, crude statistics on rising Chinese investments and trade or statements by governmental representatives do not differ at all. Using the same language, Politika discusses new investments connecting China and Balkans with Serbia playing the key geopolitical role (Politika, 2016) or the harbinger of the “Chinese miracle” gradually reviving Serbian economy (Politika, 2019).
Nonetheless, there are two crucial differences in discourses when all selected articles would be compared. First of all, whereas Danas represents a very neutral way of reporting information avoiding comments and criticism, Politika often adds two or three paragraphs supposed to “justify” reasons for Serbo-Chinese rapprochement with a harsh criticism of the West. Therefore, one can find texts criticising Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as something that would subordinate Serbia to the West and requires it to adjust to highly unfavourable demands whereas cooperation with China is voluntary and does not entail any humiliating commitments (Bilbija, 2016). Moreover, Chinese globalisation is assessed as inclusive whereas Western globalisation remains exclusive (Kavaja, 2018). The same text also criticises Germany for politicising 14+1 initiative trying to deprive CEE countries of their free will to decide on their own economies. There are also articles arguing that China also invests in Western Europe because the EU would like to benefit from Chinese investments (Avakumović, 2022). In the same way, Serbia should also be allowed to trade with China and attract Chinese FDIs simply because Serbia is a sovereign country and has the right to do so (Politika, 2022).
The second essential difference in discourses regards perception of the consequences of Chinese investments in Serbia. Despite numerous neutral articles found in Danas on Chinese FDIs, there are some that would have a more critical stance. For instance, one of the texts talks about issues regarding transparency of Chinese FDIs and flow of the capital to Serbia that might contribute to the increase of corruption (Danas, 2022). The article reports about a social movement protesting against a tyre factory bought by China in Zrenjanin pointing out concerns regarding transparency of financial flows as well as risks of environmental pollution. The text drives comparative conclusion with the negative consequences of Chinese investments in Africa. The other article is even more critical and describes in detail Chinese “dirty” investments into Serbian energy production and development of plants powered by fossil fuels, concerns about environmental damage and pollution in Majdanpek where a copper mine was bought by a Chinese company or Smederevo and its steel plant also bought by China (Danas, 2021). Some other less critical texts write about China refusing to cancel or delay the repayment of loans taken by the Serbian government (Danas, 2023c). Moreover, it is speculated that Serbia might take even more loans from Chinese banks in the future to cover social welfare and investments costs exposing Serbian economy to the risk of serious indebtness. Consequently, Belgrade might follow a similar scenario to the one of Montenegro whose government took a loan for a motorway in 2014 representing 25% of state’s GDP (Kovačević, 2021).
Interestingly enough, there are almost no articles about risks entailing Chinese investments in Serbia published by Politika. Nevertheless, there are two texts that deserve particular attention. One of the articles mentions about an initiative of the European Parliament to closely monitor Chinese investments in Serbia due to environmental and security threats (Avakumović, 2021). One of the professors asked about his opinion regarding potential move of the European Parliament argues that the EU is simply jealous about Chinese investments in Serbia. Moreover, he claims that the EU should firstly apologise for all environmental damage and pollution caused during NATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999 and only afterwards it would have the moral right to criticise Serbia for its environment or foreign policy. The other article indeed admits that coal mines in Bor contribute to the air pollution and that the scale of pollution reaches so high levels that the Chinese management of the mine decided to temporarily suspend functioning of the mine (Politika, 2020). Nonetheless, the article claims that the air pollution was there in Bor before Chinese company bought the mine. Moreover, China is actually the side that cares about environment in Serbia exactly because it decided to suspend work of the mine. In short, in contrast to Danas, there is not a single word that would express any scepticism or criticism about Chinese investments into heavy industry and energy production in Serbia.
Conclusions
With regard to the hypotheses presented earlier in the text, the Serbian case shows that neutral and positive discourses about China and Chinese presence in Serbia dominate both in Danas and Politika which might explain why so many Serbs perceive China in terms of an important political partner and investor. Regardless of political occurrences, there are no indicators showing any change of discourses on the timeline between 2015 and 2023. This being said, Serbian perception of China is immune to rising tensions between the West and Beijing or Chinese stance to the war in Ukraine. The number of positive discourses in general is much higher than in Polish media outlets which confirms the hypothesis on Serbian narratives being more pro-Chinese than Polish ones.
Despite Danas writes about China in a positive or neutral tone, there is a few articles that critically assess Chinese investments and economic cooperation. Politika is very focused on criticising the West for not allowing Serbia to conduct its independent foreign policy towards Beijing arguing that Serbo-Chinese cooperation is more beneficial than Serbo-Western one since it does not involve any unfavourable commitments. Moreover, the way how environmental and security threats of Chinese investments are ignored and denied by Politika serves as a clear evidence proving pro-government media outlet being more pro-Chinese than the anti-government one. This also confirms one of the hypotheses of this paper which was rejected by the Polish case.
7. Conclusion
This paper concentrated on perception of Chinese presence in Poland and Serbia in pro- and anti-government media outlets. Referring to quantitative data based on opinion polls of China as an international actor as well as analyses of foreign policy strategies of Polish and Serbian governments, this text came up with three different hypotheses. Firstly, one can confirm that the scale of positive discourses in Serbian media on China is definitely higher than in the Polish ones. Secondly, shifts of international relations and rising tensions between China and the West especially after the beginning of the Russian invasion against Ukraine demonstrate a significant change of discourses on China in Polish media. Thirdly, only Serbian case has confirmed that the government might instrumentalise China to construct positive discourses in order to realise own foreign policy agenda by counterbalancing Beijing against the EU. On the other hand, China is not used in Poland to serve as a counterbalancing leverage against Brussels. This study presents a significant contribution to the qualitative assessment of discursive analysis of Chinese presence in CEE. In order to extend the scope of the research, new project might include other countries of the CEE region as well as analyse more media outlets to make the pro- and anti-government distinction more comprehensive.
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Endnotes
- Originally, there were 16 members of the initiative and the number increased to 17 in 2019 when Greece became a full member. Nonetheless, in 2021 Lithuania left the initiative that was followed in 2022 by Latvia and Estonia. Therefore, at the time of writing this text on 31st July 2023, the initiative was composed of 14 CEE states, hence its name throughout the text will be referred as 14+1 initiative. ↑
