Spain’s Incentives to Counter Russia, Support Ukraine’s NATO Accession, and Grow its Strategic Presence in Europe

Spain, has not advocated a clear position on Ukraine’s NATO accession, partially out of not wanting to be the first power in Western Europe to take a stance, partially as it is not outlined as a central aspect of the Spanish strategy, but also because the conversation may appear premature given Ukraine is still engaged in a full-fledged conventional conflict. Even so, now presents an opportunity for Spain to lead this conversation, similar as it has in Palestine with the Israel-Hamas conflict.^[1]

Unlike the EU, peace with neighbors is not a formality for entry to NATO,^[2] and given the gap in security leadership on the European continent as a result from Brexit but also the continuing Franco-German opposition, now is an opportune time for Spain to pave its way as an alternative, forward-thinking actor for European security.

While Spain does not have a single Russia policy or an institutionalized foreign policy, Spain holds many incentives to address the threat of Russia just as it does to lead the conversation of Ukraine’s NATO accession.

One of the largest countries in the EU, Spain’s geographical placement gives the government a unique perspective on Russia. Unlike any other European country, Spain’s territory, alongside an extensive coastline, comprises the Iberian Peninsula, archipelagos, islands, promontories, and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Africa.^[3] However, as a result of its placement, it is often overlooked in discussions of EU-Russia relations.^[4]

At the southwest of the EU, Spain is very much Western European, with discourse around Ukraine historically corresponding to Germany and France, emphasizing diplomacy in addressing Russia’s engagement with the country.^[5] Spain is also very much Southern European, creating a more ingrained focus on the Southern Mediterranean and North Africa over issues in Eastern Europe.^[6]

In the 2021 National Security Strategy (NSS) of Spain, the document gave emphasis to the importance of the southern flank, particularly the Sahel, for European and transatlantic security. The document specifically articulates the Mediterranean Sea as a “nexus and a strategic bridge to Africa and the Middle East, but it is also a scenario of tension and friction where different countries and actors seek to impose their criteria and interests, often disregarding international law and violating the sovereignty of coastal states.”^[7] The NSS also affirmed Spain’s support for NATO operations in Eastern Europe and the Missile Defense System as a deterrent. La Moncloa in 2019 underscored the Maghreb as a focus for Spanish foreign policy and called Africa a “strategic and political priority for Spain.” If “Morocco and Algeria were always a priority, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya now also share that rating, mainly for energy and security reasons.”^[8] In the transatlantic and European security conversation, this description of Spain’s foreign policy and its advocacy for the “360-degree approach”^[9] to European security often seems to act as a receding force from a focus on Russia. Yet, the 2021 NSS positions the concern in the MENA regions from the perspective of a gathering place for countries to impose their malign influence, to which Russia actively does.

Russia’s Wagner Group has a growing presence in Africa, with documented activity in Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali, and elsewhere as a close relationship with Wagner for military support and training.^[10] Russia is also asserting itself in Africa to diversify its energy and resource imports to have a greater advantage on the battlefield.^[11]

Combined with Moscow’s interference in the Catalan crisis^[12] and Spain’s record of support for NATO’s eastern flank, Spain’s 360-degree approach is not a distraction from Russia but a unique perspective on the threat Russia poses.

As La Moncloa put it, “after joining the then European Community in 1986, the European vocation has determined Spanish foreign policy.”^[13] Traditionally, Spain’s domestic discourse on Russia and Ukraine has reflected its geographic position within Europe and its own domestic political challenges, often leading towards a neutral position on Russia that is reflective of their larger international passivity.^[14]

Under the previous Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, the country’s passivity translated into a disjointed response to Russia. They supported EU sanctions and NATO military measures after the annexation of Crimea, while also, in the middle of Russia’s 2014 Ukraine invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov received the highest honors in Spain. This period of Ruso-Spanish relations led many to believe that Spain had no deep interests in Russia.^[15]

Yet, in their overwhelming support for Ukraine post-2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Spain joined the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada in sending NATO troops to Latvia.^[16] At the forefront of Spanish foreign policy is pro-European sentiment supporting a common EU stance on developing crises.^[17] Underscoring that is the recognition that the main guarantor of Spanish and European security is the U.S. within NATO, hence, Spain’s plans to increase defense spending in compliance with NATO requirements.^[18] Even though strong criticisms of the EU and NATO role in Ukraine are commonplace in Spain,^[19] and Spain’s historically held “bilateral relations, based on a dense network of agreements, conventions, and instruments for political and economic consultations”^[20] with Russia, their current policy shift and internal domestic politics reflect larger motivations for countering Russia.

This moment, among the risks, also presents large opportunities for the Spanish government. Brexit has changed the balance of power within the EU, leaving room for Spain to give more direction in the EU’s confrontation with the current geopolitical and geoeconomic realities. Pedro Sánchez is also a social democrat, a declining occurrence in today’s EU.^[21] Furthermore, Manfred Weber, the leader of the center-right European People’s Party, criticized tensions inside the Spanish government around support for Ukraine, noting the problems that could arise when Spain took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in July, 2023. A Spanish spokesperson made clear the Spanish government’s position:

“We recognize what the origin of this war is, and it’s pure imperialism, and it’s Putin, and we are with Ukraine and we show steadfast support and solidarity with Ukraine, and with its people, and with its territorial integrity and with its sovereignty. On this issue the government speaks with one single voice.”^[22]

This continued clarity is what the EU and NATO need to confront this challenge. In line with this messaging from the government, Spain should take advantage of this opportunity to gain greater influence at the European and transatlantic table to offer its unique perspective. Spanish politician Josep Borrell and the EU’s foreign policy chief has strongly advocated for the EU to ensure a free Ukraine with complete territorial integrity.

“Unhappily, this is not the moment for diplomatic conversations about peace. It’s the moment of supporting the war militarily,” Borrell told Euronews. “If you want peace, push Russia to withdraw. Push Russia to stop the war. Don’t tell me to stop supporting Ukraine, because if I stop supporting Ukraine, certainly the war will finish soon. We cannot just finish because (if we do) Ukraine is unable to defend itself and it has to surrender. And the Russian troops will be on the Polish border and Ukraine will become a second Belarus. Do you want this kind of ending the war? No.”^[23]

The Importance of Spain’s Domestic Politics and Civil Society in Facing Russia

“All politics is local,” said former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O’Neill. This is inherently true in the case of Spain, where civil society, autonomous communities, and domestic politics directly convert to foreign policy. Foreign policy “is not a matter of a man, but of all Spaniards,” said the President of the Popular Party and former president of Galicia, Alberto Núñez Feijoo.^[24] The international validation of Spain’s foreign policy doesn’t just depend on its reliability within the international system but also on the workings of its internal society.^[25]

In the 1980’s when Spain debated the creation of its modern foreign policy and joining NATO, it came to the conclusion that consensus was needed amongst the main political entities in determining all aspects of policy within the government.^[26] This does not, however, mean that they have achieved consistent consensus. Spaniards are not united in how to cooperatively tackle today’s challenges in Spain or Europe.^[27]

In relation to Russia and Ukraine, this takes many forms. Generally, Spaniards are distrustful of Putin and authoritarianism and after the full-scale invasion were mostly in support of Ukraine. The invasion of Ukraine reminds the older Spanish generation of their own isolation without international assistance during the Spanish Civil War.^[28] Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, the Elcano Royal Institute found that 34% of the Spanish public identified Russia as the biggest national security threat, followed by Morocco (20%) and jihadist terrorism (14%). After the invasion in June 2022, 85% of those surveyed blamed Russia for the war, and 52% identified Russia as the greatest threat to Spain. In an Ipsos survey, Spain was among the highest-ranking countries in terms of the attention paid to the war (75%), a percentage that remained constant.^[29] Despite traditional thinking, Spaniards today see Russia as the primary threat of the country.

In terms of assistance to Ukraine, Eurobarometer in February 2023 found that 65% of Spaniards support the EU financing the purchase of arms for Ukraine and the supply of military equipment for the country, a similar figure to that of the rest of the EU. However, on direct defense spending, Spaniards are just slightly less supportive, with 64% believing that more money should be spent on defense in the EU, with the European average standing at 68%.^[30] Many favor more assistance to Ukraine and are consistently concerned for the well-being of the Ukrainian people. The Centre for Sociological Investigations (CIS) found that 23.4% of Spaniards were “very worried” about Ukraine, while 49.2 percent said they were “worried.” Among Spanish teenagers, UNICEF found the war to be the second-greatest worry after the effects of the pandemic.^[31]

Despite large social concern and support for Ukraine, Spain still holds firm fringe opposition. Both the far right and the far left have opposed supporting Kyiv because they are either sympathetic towards Moscow or believe that NATO does not serve the interests of Spain.^[32] Many of the traditional establishment hold “Russophile or at least Russian-friendly positions,” at times occurring alongside anti-American, anti-Western, or “anti-great power narratives. Historically, this sentiment would sit at ease within the pacifist approach of the government, which veers from military response or even sanctions, and emphasizes diplomacy. Moreover, it coupled easily with a “lack of concern with Eastern European dynamics.”^[33]

Before the recent invasion of Ukraine, VOX held many overlaps with Moscow. VOX and Russia have shared several international allies on the far right such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, and Matteo Salvini. This is not to say these individuals behave as a monolith. Each shares complicated relationships with Russia and VOX. Orbán has contested EU aid to Ukraine, questioned the EU and NATO strategy, for a time blocked Sweden’s NATO accession all while still supporting the idea of an EU army, and Orbán has promoted VOX pulling for more power in Brussels, but Orbán has not attempted to join the European Parliament far right group which VOX is a member, the European Conserva­tives and Reformists (ECR).^[34] Part of the Identity and Democracy group, Le Pen’s French far right party is not officially an ally of Vox, but still has expressed support, in May Le Pen celebrated the “spectacular breakthrough” of Santiago Abascal’s party in the local and regional elections.^[35] In addition, Le Pen has softened much of her social stances that held overlaps with VOX since gaining more power.^[36] And since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Le Pen has distanced herself from Putin, yet has held positions in support of Russia’s claim to Crimea.^[37] Salvini’s Lega party is part of the coalition government with the ECR and centre-right Forza Italia (EPP) and Selvini “once wore a T-shirt printed with Putin’s face to the EU Parliament,” and “attempted to arrange a peace mission to Moscow with flights paid by the Russian embassy.”^[38] Yet, since the war, Selvini has become a supporter of Ukrainian refugees in Italy.^[39] Moreover, revealed by WikiLeaks, organizations that have funded VOX, like Hazte Oir-CitizenGO, have received funding from Russian oligarchs aligned with the Kremlin like Konstantin Malofeev who is known by US intelligence as Putin’s “right arm for operations of political interference in Europe.”^[40] Ideologically, Moscow and VOX both venerate nationalism, opposition to the EU, authoritarianism, and opposition to gender equality. Prior to the invasion, VOX Party leader Santiago Abascal refrained from criticizing Putin in public interviews. Yet, after the invasion, Abascal largely supported Spain’s taking in refugees and sending security assistance to Ukraine, although he paired it with strong criticism of the role the EU played in the conflict.^[41] Where VOX appears in unison with the rest of Spanish political society is in regards to NATO intervention in Ukraine. This aligns with the traditional negative relationship between NATO and the far left in Spain. VOX voters’ NATO intervention stance was indistinguishable from that of Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) or Partido Popular (PP) voters.^[42]

The far left has even taken a more radical stance in some cases of Spanish assistance to Ukraine. Podemos opposes the provision of military assistance, though it won’t break ranks with Prime Minister Sánchez. Many in the coalition are openly sympathetic with Russia and blame NATO.^[43] Lluis Orriols, a professor of politics at the University Carlos III in Madrid, said “The position of Podemos is typical of the Spanish left which means it is against the Atlantic pact and NATO and not to be allied with the United States. But Podemos are not against helping Ukraine. They are more in favor of humanitarian aid. They have a more pacifist attitude towards the war.”

Despite the views of the radical right and radical left, Spaniards largely are concerned about Ukraine, blame Russia, and seek to support further security development and assistance.

Ruso-Spanish Relations Pre February 24, 2022

Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, what the Elcano Royal Institute called “modest but healthy bilateral relations” with Russia, were described by Russia as “favorably neutral.”^[44] The 2021 NSS referred to “Russia’s increasingly assertive position” in the East that has “strained relations with the EU.” Still, the government strategy made clear that Spain remains “committed to engaging in dialogue with Russia, despite the difficulties, based on respect for international law, the defense of States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, and respect for human rights in its external action.”^[45] The 2021 NSS also focused on the importance of the European dimension and strategic autonomy to “achieve greater resilience,” and that a “stronger NATO means greater European security.”^[46] The NSS made clear that collective defense is the core of Spain’s national security and that multilateralism is “the optimal vehicle for protecting interests and values against shared threats to security.” Within the transatlantic conversation, Spain stressed the importance of the southern flank. Spain’s previous indecisive stance with Russia even within the Alliance, was the product of Spain’s diverse traditional strategic thinking, lack of direct confrontation with Russia, and serious internal challenges.

Facing serious migration and economic problems, Spain has in recent years chosen to adhere to the general EU position on international issues. Within that, Spain still sat on the other end of the spectrum with relatively positive relations with Russia after the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. After 2014, unlike much of the rest of Europe, Spain only purchased 14% of its oil from Russia and none of Russia’s gas. They also, at this point, did not view Russia’s actions in Ukraine as a direct security concern. Even with miniscule economic repercussions, Spain only reluctantly supported EU sanctions against Russia.^[47] Spaniards were generally cohesive in opposing “escalation towards Russia beyond targeted sanctions.”^[48] Before 2022, Spain prioritized the avoidance of escalatory measures with Russia. During the 2017 Catalan crisis, El Pais published a “detailed investigation,” concluding that the Kremlin had used media outlets and internet bots to divide Catalonia. However, when Russia asked the Spanish government to confirm these claims, Spain said that it did not consider Moscow to be behind the spread of fake news.^[49]

At times, Spain seemed to go beyond turning a blind eye to Russian concerns, placing controversy within the Alliance. With U.S. objections, Spanish ports in North Africa hosted ten Russian ships per year from 2010 to 2016. This only ceased to occur because of Russia moving its ships to Malta.^[50] On certain issues, such as separatism, Madrid appeared closer to Moscow than the rest of the EU. Due to confronting Basque and Catalan separatism, Spain was one of only five EU countries to not recognize Kosovo’s independence.^[51]

Former Head of the European Council on Foreign Relations Madrid Office, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, broke down Spain’s strategic thinking towards Ukraine and Russia surrounding the 2014 invasion into four groups. He coins the four groups: the “understanders,” “equidistants,” “pro-Maidans,” and the “Cold Warrior Atlanticists.”^[52]

The understanders see Ukraine and Russia through a realist perspective and believe to prioritize ‘stability.’ “They see understanding Russia’s claims and grievances as hugely important,” such as NATO enlargement and Kosovo, even promoting conspiracy theories that Maidan was the result of the U.S. or EU.^[53]

The equidistant aligned with the German perspective of balancing between three ambitions: 1) supporting the EU but being critical of EU policies; 2) promoting diplomacy with Russia while agreeing to moderate sanctions; and 3) a conditional support of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) approach. They were generally pro-European but sought a “compromise-driven” approach.^[54]

An extreme minority in Spain, the pro-Maidans wanted to consolidate the democratization of Eastern Europe, were very vocal against the Kremlin’s imperialist agenda, and advocated for prioritizing relations with Russia over the development of Eastern Europe.^[55]

Lastly, Lasheras describes the Cold Warrior Atlanticists, who see Ukraine and Russia through the lens of U.S. power and Western hegemony. They focused on American strategic retrenchment and hard power to deter and confront Russia.^[56]

What most of all Lashera believed to be the growing thinking in Spain surrounding Russia was a “new realism” that blended “geopolitics, geo-economics, and re-energized national instincts in a sui generis, uniquely Spanish way.” He believed amongst Spanish strategic thinkers it gained more traction due to the deterioration of stability and, therefore, security from the MENA region. “This Spanish Jacobinism” he said, was very “state-centric and order-focused,” drawing from Realpolitik readings, it fell under the thinking of Kissinger and, in the end, created a counterbalance to the otherwise pro-liberal and democratization, Spain.^[57]

Ruso-Spanish Relations Post Full Scale Russian Invasion of Ukraine

In the buildup to the war and following its initiation, Spain has taken a more direct and confrontational stance toward Russia, with overwhelming support for Ukraine. Immediately upon the invasion on February 24, 2022, the Spanish government condemned the military invasion and called for the coordination of EU partners and NATO allies to conduct an appropriate response to the illegal invasion.^[58] At the forefront of this reset in policy is Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, who visited Kyiv just before the invasion and after the invasion supported EU sanctions; and the sending of lethal equipment to Ukraine from Spain, including the reverse in precedent of sending offensive ammunition and grenade launchers. Albares has even gone as far as to say that alongside supporting Ukraine’s resistance and sovereignty, the goal of Spain is the “economic collapse of Putin’s Russia.”^[59]

In February 2023, Albares defended Spain sending tanks to Ukraine, saying it would not escalate the war with Russia. Albares said, “Unfortunately, Vladimir Putin does not need any excuse to escalate [the war]. They [the Russians] will do what they want. We all want peace but there is a person, [Putin], who doesn’t want it.”^[60] Prime Minister Sánchez was the first international leader to raise the idea of sending tanks to Ukraine.^[61]

This change in policy did not come overnight. According to the 2021-2021 Foreign Action Strategy, despite Russia only making up 0.7% of Spanish exports and sitting at 48th for the recipients of Spanish investments, the strategy asserts that Russia, together with Ukraine, is Spain’s main priority.^[62] The strategy’s main goals in context to Eastern Europe can be understood as the following:

• “Develop a constructive, more structured and predictable relationship with Russia, within the framework of agreed EU policy” through integrating the Spanish economy with Russia, while also defending “the stability of Ukraine and Belarus,” and uphold international law.
• Reaffirm the role of NATO as the central collective defense actor in Europe, “work within the framework of NATO and EU commitments to strengthen security in Eastern Europe,” but also “promote the strengthening of the EU’s autonomous strategic capabilities.”
• And lastly, “Strengthen ties with Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian civil society.”^[63]

As the 2021 NSS expresses, Spain wants continued coordination with the UN and NATO, recognizing the need for the EU to “advance in the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular of its Common Security and Defence Policy,” to face the hybrid threats of Russia and China.^[64] However, Spain disregards the notion that NATO ever represented a threat to the Kremlin.^[65]

Spain has been proactive in responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The government backed the UN Human Rights Council Resolution of March 4, 2022, which created an independent international commission to investigate the invasion of Ukraine, and it supported Resolution (ES-11/5) in November 2022, demanding that Russia pay reparations for the significant material damage caused by the war.^[66]

In December 2022, estimates of the costs of rebuilding Ukraine were between $349 billion and $750 billion.^[67] The issue of the reconstruction of Ukraine is particularly important to Spain. In July 2022, the Spanish government participated in the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, where it pledged €250 million for future construction; and Spanish leaders attended the Paris Conference to coordinate efforts in Europe to streamline aid to Ukraine to “maximize its impact.” There, Spain announced that Ukraine would be a “priority for Spanish official aid in 2023.”^[68]

Spain was also among the signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) calling for an investigation of potential Russian war crimes, and for the first time, Spain is training foreign troops on Spanish soil. At the Toledo Infantry Academy, as part of the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM), Spain has trained 400 Ukrainian soldiers a month and will run for an initial period of two years.^[69] In total, by December 2022, Spain had contributed €282 million to the European fund for Ukraines defense. The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism calculated that the total value of these dual use exports to Ukraine in the first half of 2022 was €209.7 million. In the first half of 2022, Spain provided 155-mm artillery projectiles (56% of its total military exports to Ukraine), bombs, weapons of up to 20 mm, helmets, armor plating, and 77,000 winter uniforms. All of which was coordinated with NATO allies and the EU via the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group.^[70]

In context to the invasion, other important connections to Ukraine that incentivize Spanish support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia are Spain’s trade relations with Ukraine and its lenient policy on accepting immigrants and refugees. Leading up to the war, Spain was an important trading partner for Ukraine as the EU’s largest importer of Ukrainian cereals and the third worldwide. Acciona, a Spanish company, invested heavily in Ukraine’s renewable energy sector and had an established presence in the country. In the context of immigration, before the invasion, there were already over 100,000 Ukrainian nationals living in Spain, and following the war, Spain received another 170,000 refugees.^[71]

The political side of Spain’s pro-Ukraine relations is slightly more complicated. Spain supported Ukraine’s decision to apply for accession to the EU in February 2022 and eventually, before the European Council held on June 23 and 24, 2022, La Moncloa granted Ukraine EU candidate status together with Moldova and Georgia. However, regarding Ukraine’s NATO bid, like most NATO allies, Spain has refrained from responding.^[72] While domestic politics have been relatively unanimous in supporting Ukraine. Podemos continues to oppose the sending of arms to the Ukrainian forces.^[73] “We are people of peace. We are committed to peace, to deescalating the conflict, to avoiding military exercises in the area, to dialogue and diplomacy,” said Equality Minister Irene Montero, of the Unidas Podemos. Spain is “the country of ‘no’ to war,” she said. This sentiment still resonates with much of Spain, but Sanchez is, perhaps surprisingly, finding support in the main opposition Popular Party.^[74] Within the wider discussion, there is still NATO skepticism. Former Deputy Prime Minister of Spain, Pablo Iglesias, accused Defense Minister Margarita Robles of “treating Spaniards like idiots for justifying NATO’s role in the geopolitical crisis.”^[75]

Considering the multifaceted factors to Spain’s stance in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, La Moncloa should publicly support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Spain (with overwhelming public support for Ukraine) has interests in European continental security, countering malign Russian influence in North Africa, and rebuilding Ukraine.

Spain’s Incentives to Address Russia/Support Ukraine Key Takeaways:

To promote security on the European continent. To Assure a stable Africa: countering Russia’s malign activity in North Africa. Reconstruct Ukraine to fulfill its position as a vital trade partner of Spain. Spain’s civil society is behind Ukraine and views Russia as an increasing threat above all other concerns. Uphold the international legal system and hold Russia accountable for war crimes. The pressure from within the EU and NATO to be a reliable security ally. Affirm the commitment of NATO’s security assurance. The opportunity to be a leader in Europe on security.

References

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36. David Latona, Maria Martinez, and Matthias Williams, “Spain’s Vox Party Stumbles, Testing Limits of European Far-Right …,” Retuters, July 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/spains-vox-party-stumbles-testing-limits-european-far-right-advance-2023-07-24/. ↑

37. Romain Geoffroy and Maxime Vaudano, “What Are Marine Le Pen’s Ties to Vladimir Putin’s Russia?,” Le Monde.fr, April 21, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2022/04/21/what-are-marine-le-pen-s-ties-to-vladimir-putin-s-russia_5981192_8.html; Davide Basso, “Le Pen Insists Crimea Is ‘Russian,’” www.euractiv.com, May 25, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/le-pen-insists-crimea-is-russian/. ↑

38. Federica Pascale, “Salvini under Pressure to Show Cancelled Deal with Putin’s Party after Navalny Remarks,” www.euractiv.com, February 21, 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/salvini-under-pressure-to-show-cancelled-deal-with-putins-party-after-navalny-remarks/; Hannah Roberts, Jonathan Lemire, and Eli Stokols, “Putin Can’t Count on His Friends in Italy Anymore,” POLITICO, July 26, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-giorgia-meloni-relationship-russia-italy-not-friends/. ↑

39. Hannah Roberts, “Italy’s Matteo Salvini Recasts Himself as Champion of Ukraine’s Refugees,” POLITICO, April 20, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/italys-matteo-salvini-recasts-himself-as-champion-of-ukraines-refugees/. ↑

40. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó, Antoni Comín i Oliveres, and Clara Ponsatí Obiols, “Parliamentary Question: On Transparency Regarding Donations to Political Parties: E-001380/2022: European Parliament,” Parliamentary question – E-001380/2022, April 4, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-001380_EN.html; Sian Norris, “Millions of Russian Roubles Funded Far-Right Discord in Europe,” Byline Times, March 2, 2022, https://bylinetimes.com/2022/03/02/millions-of-russian-roubles-funded-far-right-discord-in-europe/. ↑

41. Hugo Marcos-Marne, “Hugo Marcos Marne on ‘the Spanish Radical Right under the Shadow of the Invasion of Ukraine,’” ECPS, March 29, 2023, https://www.populismstudies.org/hugo-marcos-marne-on-the-spanish-radical-right-under-the-shadow-of-the-invasion-of-ukraine/. ↑

42. Hugo Marcos-Marne, “Hugo Marcos Marne on ‘the Spanish Radical Right under the Shadow of the Invasion of Ukraine.’” ↑

43. Borja Lasheras, “LA Activista: Spain Stands up to Putin’s Russia.” ↑

44. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine;” Alexander Dunaev, “Why Spain Doesn’t Fear the ‘Russian Threat.’” ↑

45. “Estrategia De Seguridad Nacional 2021.” ↑

46. “Estrategia De Seguridad Nacional 2021.” ↑

47. Alexander Dunaev, “Why Spain Doesn’t Fear the ‘Russian Threat.’” ↑

48. Francisco de Borja Lasheras, “Four Spanish Factions on Russia and Ukraine.” ↑

49. Alexander Dunaev, “Why Spain Doesn’t Fear the ‘Russian Threat.’” ↑

50. Ibid. ↑

51. Ibid. ↑

52. Francisco de Borja Lasheras, “Four Spanish Factions on Russia and Ukraine.” ↑

53. Ibid. ↑

54. Ibid. ↑

55. Ibid. ↑

56. Ibid. ↑

57. Ibid. ↑

58. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” ↑

59. Borja Lasheras, “LA Activista: Spain Stands up to Putin’s Russia.” ↑

60. “2021-2024 FOREIGN ACTION STRATEGY,” 2021-2024 FOREIGN ACTION STRATEGY § (n.d.), pp. 1-122. ↑

61. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” ↑

62. “2021-2024 FOREIGN ACTION STRATEGY,” 2021-2024 FOREIGN ACTION STRATEGY § (n.d.), pp. 1-122 ↑

63. Ibid. ↑

64. “Estrategia De Seguridad Nacional 2021.” ↑

65. EFE Diario de Sevilla, “España Reclama Una ‘Auténtica’ Política Exterior y Defensa Común En La Ue,” Diario de Sevilla (Diario de Sevilla, March 14, 2022), https://www.diariodesevilla.es/espana/Espana-pide-autentica-politica-exterior-defensa-comun-UE_0_1665133789.html. ↑

66. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” ↑

67. Steven Pifer, “The Russia-Ukraine War and Its Ramifications for Russia,” Brookings (Brookings, February 24, 2023), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-ramifications-for-russia/. ↑

68. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” ↑

69. Ibid. ↑

70. María Santillán O’Shea Iliana Olivié, “Spanish Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” ↑

71. Ibid. ↑

72. Ibid. ↑

73. Juan Tovar Ruiz, “¿Una Política Exterior Compartida Para España?.” ↑

74. Paula Chouza José Marcos, “Ukraine Crisis Shakes up Domestic Politics in Spain, Exposing Division over NATO Plan,” EL PAÍS English, January 24, 2022, https://english.elpais.com/spain/2022-01-24/ukraine-crisis-shakes-up-domestic-politics-in-spain-exposing-division-over-nato-plan.html. ↑

75. Ibid. ↑